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Optimal taxation problems in open-economy models are not trivial extensions of
similar analyses in closed-economy models. In this discussion, I emphasize two impor-
tant caveats of open-economy optimal policy problem. First, the intertemporal budget
constraint of the government is not a necessary restriction that a Ramsey government
should consider in its maximization problem. This point revisit in the current frame-
work a previous argument discussed in Woodford (1996). Second, the specification of the
strategies followed by each government is critical for the outcome of the non-cooperative
allocation. Finally, I argue that in the analysis of Baxter and King (2005), (BK in what
follow), it would be interesting to know more about how the labor wedge is set across
the diﬀerent allocations and models analyzed.
Intertemporal budget constraint of the government in open economy mod-
els
In the so-called Ramsey’s approach to optimal taxation, the government chooses
taxes in order to maximize the utility of the households under the sequence of resource
constraints of the economy and the constraints implied by the optimizing behavior of
households. Government is then ‘benevolent’. It would seem natural to assume that a
relevant constraint for this optimal policy problem is the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government. But, in the Ramsey’s approach, this can be justified only if this
constraint belongs either to the resource constraints of the economy or is an implication
of the optimizing behavior of households.
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In this section I show that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
is a relevant constraint for the optimization problem of a ‘Ramsey’ government in a
closed-economy model but not in an open-economy model.
Consider the closed-economy model presented in BK where households maximize
U =
∞X
t=0
βtu(ct, nt) (1)
in which β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1 and u(·) is the utility function of
consumption, c, and labor, n, with standard properties. Households are subject to a
flow budget constraint of the form
bpt+1
1 + rt
= bpt + (1− τnt )wtnt − (1 + τ ct)ct. (2)
At time t, households’ revenues are given by labor income, where wt are wages taxed
at the rate τnt , and by the value of the financial assets carried over from the previous
period, bpt ; consumption is also taxed at the rate τ
c
t . Households can borrow or lend at
time t using an asset, bpt+1, which is issued at discount and gives a return rt. An initial
condition on the assets at time 0 is given, b0 = 0. The constraint (2) is not enough to
impose a well-defined maximization problem, for consumption can be infinite. A natural
borrowing limit conditions of the form
bpt ≥ −
∞X
T=t
Rt,T (1− τnT )wTnT > −∞ (3)
is added, stating that households’ borrowing in a certain period cannot exceed the
present discounted value, net of taxes, of wage revenues discounted by the appropriate
factor defined as
Rt,T ≡
T−1Y
s=t
µ
1
1 + rs
¶
for each T > t while Rt,t ≡ 1. Household’s optimization problem is to maximize (1)
under the sequences of flow budget constraint (2) and the borrowing-limit constraints
(3), given the initial condition b0. This maximization problem has two other equivalent
formulations. In the first, the utility is maximized under the sequences of flow budget
constraints (2) and the intertemporal budget constraint of the households
∞X
t=0
R0,t(1 + τ ct)ct ≤
∞X
t=0
R0,t(1− τnt )wtnt.
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In the second, the utility is maximized under the sequences of flow budget constraints
(2) and the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
R0,T b
p
T ≥ 0.
In this economy, the government is subject to a flow budget constraint of the form
bgt+1
1 + rt
= bgt + τ
n
t wtnt + τ
c
tct − gt (4)
in which bgt denotes government assets at time t carried over from the previous period; gt
represents exogenous government purchases of the only good produced in this economy.
Government can borrow and lend freely from the private sector. Goods are produced
in the economy with a technology of the form yt = atnt where at is an exogenous
productivity shock. Equilibrium in the goods and assets markets requires that
yt = ct + gt, (5)
bpt + b
g
t = 0, (6)
respectively.
Firm’s optimization problem implies that wages are equalized to productivity
wt = at
Optimality conditions on the side of the consumers imply that: 1) the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor is equated to the labor wedge
un(ct, nt)
uc(ct, nt)
=
(1− τnt )
(1 + τ ct)
wt; (7)
2) the marginal utilities of consumption between subsequent periods are related through
the following Euler equation
uc(ct, nt)
(1 + τ ct)
= β(1 + rt)
uc(ct+1, nt+1)
(1 + τ ct+1)
; (8)
3) the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer is satisfied with equality
∞X
t=0
R0,t(1 + τ ct)ct =
∞X
t=0
R0,t(1− τnt )wtnt (9)
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or alternatively the transversality condition is satisfied with equality
lim
T→∞
R0,T b
p
T = 0. (10)
As a consequence of this optimizing behavior, (9) together with the resource constraint
of the economy
yt = atnt = wtnt = gt + ct (11)
implies the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
∞X
t=0
R0,t[τ ctct + τ
n
t wtnt] =
∞X
t=0
R0,tgt (12)
and viceversa (12) and (11) imply (9).
Although the government is only subject to a flow budget constraint of the form (4),
the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is also an equilibrium condition
as a consequence of the optimizing behavior of the consumers in this economy. The
intertemporal budget constraint of the government mirrors through (11) that of the
households.
In an alternative interpretation, the flow budget constraint (4) is not enough to imply
that (12) holds. It would be the case were a transversality condition of the form
lim
T→∞
R0,T b
g
T = 0 (13)
holding. And indeed this is the case since the equilibrium in the asset markets (6)
together with (10) implies (13).
In a multi-country open-economy model, this implication does not hold. Consider,
for simplicity, a two-country (home and foreign) version of the above model. In this
case, equilibrium in the goods and asset markets requires that
yt + y
∗
t = ct + c
∗
t + gt + g
∗
t , (14)
bpt + b
∗p
t + b
g
t + b
∗g
t = 0, (15)
where starred variables denote the respective variables for the foreign country. Condi-
tions (7), (8), (9) and (10) hold for the home and foreign households. However, it is not
the case that (12) holds for each country. Indeed the only implication of condition (10)
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together with the respective condition for the foreign households and the equilibrium
condition (15) is that
lim
T→∞
R0,T (b
g
T + b
∗g
t ) = 0
and then that an intertemporal budget constraint of the government holds at an aggre-
gate level. i.e.
∞X
t=0
R0,t[τ ctct + τ
∗c
t c
∗
t + τ
n
t wtnt + τ
∗n
t w
∗
tn
∗
t ] =
∞X
t=0
R0,t[gt + g
∗
t ].
As a consequence of the possible violation of the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government at the country level, it is not necessarily the case that the intertemporal
resource constraints
∞X
t=0
R0,t(yt − gt − ct) = 0
∞X
t=0
R0,t(y
∗
t − g∗t − c∗t ) = 0 (16)
hold for each country, as it is instead assumed in BK. A benevolent Ramsey central
planner that maximizes the aggregate utility of the households belonging to this union
might not necessarily find optimal to obey to (16) in its optimal plan. Violation of (16)
might even be possible in the non-cooperative allocation.
It would be interesting to investigate whether there are cases in which a central
planner would prefer that (16) holds for both countries while in the non-cooperative
allocation (16) would be instead violated. Perhaps it is even possible to argue for cases
in which the equilibrium allocation for the endogenous variables that results from a
strategic game can be non stationary, even though exogenous disturbances are assumed
stationary.
Strategy spaces in open-economy models
In the characterization of the optimal policy problem of a closed-economy model it
does not really matter whether the instrument of policy is specified or not, unless this
specification represents a constraint on the set of possible equilibrium allocations. In-
stead, in an open-economy problem, this can be an important issue and it is moreover
critical when non-cooperative allocations are analyzed. Indeed, non-cooperative allo-
cations depend on the concept of strategic equilibrium assumed and in particular on
the strategies specified for each of the two governments. As an example, in a standard
duopoly problem the equilibrium outcome is diﬀerent whether prices or quantities are
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assumed as strategies. In this paper, it is assumed that the strategy of a generic gov-
ernment j is specified in terms of the variables ξnjt, ξ
c
jt. In particular ξ
n
jt, ξ
c
jt are defined
as
ξnjt = Λj(1− τnjt)
ξcjt = Λj(1 + τ
c
jt)
where
Λj = Λj({τnjt}, {τ cjt}, {δt}, {wt}).
Moreover δt depends also on the tax rates τnit and τ
c
it for each i 6= j. A game in which
each government chooses optimally ξnjt, ξ
c
jt under the constraints of the economy taking
as given ξnit, ξ
c
it for each other government i, is likely not to correspond to a game in
which the strategy space is specified in terms of τnjt and τ
c
jt. Indeed in the latter case,
government in country i can internalize the eﬀect of its action on the variable Λj of
country j, while this is precluded in the former case. Whether there is equivalence
between the outcomes of these two games should be proved. The game in which the
strategies are specified in terms of the tax rates τnjt and τ
c
jt seems the one relevant
for policy analysis. Indeed one might wonder how it is possible to assume that each
government decides on the variables ξnjt, ξ
c
jt which are then non-linear functions of the
tax rates, even of those of the other countries. It is important to note that this device
is helpful to get an analytical solution, which otherwise I doubt it will be possible.
Other comments
An interesting result, robust to the closed and open-economy versions of the model, is
the fact that the labor wedge is required to be constant across time. The labor wedge, k,
is given by the following expression
k =
un(ct, nt)
uc(ct, nt)
1
wt
=
1− τnt
1 + τ ct
and measures the distortions existing in this economy. The fact that this wedge is
constant across the diﬀerent specifications requires further investigation. In particular,
it seems that an important aspect to know is the level at which this wedge is set across the
diﬀerent models and allocation. First, it would be interesting to know whether having
a small-open economy model implies a diﬀerent k with respect to the closed-economy
case. Moreover, the size of the labor wedge would matter in the comparison between
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the cooperative and non-cooperative allocation for the evaluation of the magnitude of
the externalities and gains from cooperation. Given the constant-labor-wedge result,
the paper focuses on the fact that sometimes the single tax rates τnt and τ
c
t can be time
varying. However, I suspect that the time-varying properties of the tax rates is likely to
be of second-order importance with respect to the wedge diﬀerences, if any. And indeed,
fiscal policy is usually thought to have level (or structural) eﬀect on the equilibrium
allocation. The paper is silent on whether there is such a role of fiscal policy that comes
out from this model and more research on this issue is needed.
References
[1] Baxter, Marianne and Robert G. King (2005), “Fiscal Externalities and Optimal
Taxation in an Economic Community,” NBER International Seminar on Macroeco-
nomics, forthcoming.
[2] Woodford, Michael (1997), “Control of the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price
Stability?” in G. Calvo and M. King, eds., The Debt Burden and Monetary Policy,
London: Macmillan, 1997.
7
